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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
formality of an amendment is needed, if the proof subsequently shows that a prayer for partial divorce should have
been made instead of or in addition to one for absolute
divorce.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL B A N K RUPTCY ACT-ENCROACHMENT UPON STATE
POWERS--ASHTON V. CAMERON COUNTY
WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 11
A Texas water improvement district filed a petition in
a Federal District Court for a readjustment of its debts
under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of May 24, 1934,2 alleging insolvency and inability to meet its obligations as
they matured. The petition alleged that more than 30 per
cent of the bondholders had accepted the plan of adjustment
submitted for confirmation and that ultimately more than
two-thirds would do so. Owners of more than 5 per cent of
outstanding bonds intervened and moved to dismiss the
petition. Held (four justices dissenting), the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act was an unconstitutional encroachment upon
State governmental powers; the fiscal affairs of a State
political sub-division cannot be subjected to the control of
the Federal government, irrespective of consent having been
given thereto by the State.
The case presents an interesting development in the interrelationship of the State and Federal governments under
our constitutional system,-particularly in view of the
unanimous decision in Baltimore National Bank v. State
Tax Commission, with which it is difficult to reconcile the
reasoning of the majority of the Court, and which is mentioned in the dissenting opinion only.
The Act, in authorizing State political sub-divisions to
petition for a readjustment of their obligations, specifically
provided in section 80(c)' that the Court should not, by any
order or decree, interfere with any of the political or gov- U. S. -,

80 L. Ed. 910, 56 S. Ct. 892 (1936) ; rehearingdenied, October

12, 1936, 4 U. S. L. Wk. 146, 57 S. Ct. 15 (Mem.).
2 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 301-303.
- U. S. -, 80 L. Ed. 388, 56 S. Ct. 417 (1936).
'11 U. S. C. A., sec. 303 (c).
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ernmental powers of the taxing district, or any of the property or revenues of the district necessary for essential governmental purposes; and in section 80(k)5 that nothing in
the Act should be construed to limit or impair the power of
a State to control any political sub-division in the exercise
of its political or governmental powers, including the power
to require approval of any petition or readjustment plan;
written approval of any agency established by a State to
exercise supervision over the fiscal affairs of any political
sub-division was expressly required for the reception of a
petition filed under the Act, or the putting into effect of any
plan of readjustment.'
The District Court, in dismissing the Improvement District's petition, proceeded upon an analogy to the cases dealing with the exercise of the Federal taxing power upon
State governmental agencies, and pointed out that the State
here had given no permission to the Federal government to
extend the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act to its-political
sub-divisions.7 Subsequently, however, Texas passed a
statute8 expressly authorizing all political sub-divisions in
the State to proceed under the Federal Act. This was apparently viewed as unnecessary by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which in reversing the District Court, held that the
Act was obviously not intended to interfere with any sovereign rights of the State, and said that the consent in advance of the State was not essential in order to enable
its political sub-divisions to take advantage of the law.'
In any event, the issue, as presented to the Supreme
Court, was whether Congress had power to permit State
political sub-divisions to become, with the consent of their
State, voluntary bankrupts.
In refusing to recognize such power, the majority of
the Supreme Court, like the District Court, relies upon the
11 U. S. C. A., sec. 303(k).
For the conditioqs leading to the passage of the Act, see the dissenting
opinion; see, also, Dimock, Legal Problems of Financially Embarrassed
Municipalities (1935) 22 Virginia L. R. 39.
"In re Cameron County water Improvement District No. 1, 9 F. SupP.
103, 106 (S. D. Tex. 1934) ; see note (1935) 35 Columbia L. R. 428.
8
Tex. Laws 1935, c. 107.
'Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1 v. Ashton, 81 F. (2)
90 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
6
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analogy furnished by such cases on the taxing power as
Collector v. Day, ° and Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United
States." Clearly, the argument runs, the Federal government could not have taxed the bonds of the respondent,
since this would constitute an unwarranted interference
with State fiscal matters; and the power to legislate as to
bankruptcies, being of no higher rank or importance than
the power to tax, must be subject to the same limitation implied by the necessity of preserving the governmental independence of the States. Congress having no power to act,
cannot be given such power by the consent or submission
2
of the States, citing United States v. Butler.'
Somewhat parenthetically, the Court observes that since
the States were without power to make the readajustments
contemplated by the Act directly, in view of the Constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts, they could not accomplish the same result indirectly
by giving permission to Congress to act.
That Congress could not validly have provided for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against State political
sub-divisions would seem to follow from the cases dealing
with the power to tax." The analogy, at least, is close,
since in either case there would be presented an assumption
of control on the part of the Federal government over the
exercise of State governmental functions, against an unwilling and objecting State. In the instant case, however,
the State, so far from objecting, is actively seeking Federal
action. 4 The Act in section 80(k) leaves it entirely within
the power of a State to prevent the assumption of control
by the Federal courts, which was regarded in Massachusetts
v. Mellon 5 as sufficient answer to a State's contention that
'011 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1870).
11283 U. S. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1277, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1930).
"297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 287, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
ICf. Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Cleary, 296 U. S.
315, 80 L. Ed. 209, 56 S. Ct. 235 (1936).
See, however, for an argument to
the contrary, note (1936) 31 Illinois L. R. 383; and cf. United States v.
California, 297 U. S. 175, 80 L. Ed. 367, 56 S. Ct. 421 (1936), and Board of
Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 77
L. Ed. 1025, 53 S. Ct. 509 (1933).
"Ten states filed a brief, as amici curiae, in support of the petition for a
rehearing. 4 U. S. Law Wk. 73.
262 U. S. 447, 67 L. Ed. 1078, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
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its field of governmental power had been invaded through
the exercise of the Federal spending power.
In any event, there is no apparent reason why, in questions rising out of our dual system of government, the rules
should differ in the case of an invasion by the Federal government in the field of State power and in the case of an invasion by the State in the field of Federal power. Yet it
was specifically held in Baltimore National Bank v. State
Tax Commission, supra, that a Federal governmental instrumentality may be subjected to the State taxing power
if the Federal government consents thereto." Presumably,
the same result would obtain, if, under like conditions, a
State governmental agency were subjected to Federal taxation. If so, we have the anomalous result, that the State
may voluntarily subject its political sub-divisions to the
burden of Federal taxation, but may not voluntarily obtain
for them the benefit of Federal bankruptcy laws. If not,
we have an equally anomalous result, in that Federal governmental agencies may be, with Federal consent, taxed by
the State, but that State governmental agencies, may not be
taxed by the Federal government even with the consent of
the State; the reason for the immunity from taxation in
either case being precisely the same.
If, however, the power of the Federal government to extend the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act to State political
sub-divisions, is to be based upon the consent of the State,
there would seem to be much force in the suggestion that the
States would thereby be enabled to evade the express prohibition of Art. 1, section 10 of the Constitution. The dissenting opinion argues that any impairment of existing contracts is effected by the decree of the Federal Court approving a plan of composition and not by the law of any State.
But if the consent of the State is necessary before the Federal Court may rightfully act, it would seem more true that
the impairment is in the first instance caused by the State,
since it is the State's Act (in the instant case the Texas stat10The Court said: "Taxation by state or municipality may overpass the
usual limits if the consent of the United States has removed the barriers or
lowered them".
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ute of 1935) which alone is effective to enable the scaling
down of the obligations of its political sub-divisions, That
the State could not directly authorize this is clear.17

DOUBLE LIABILITY OF A BANK STOCKHOLDER
FOR A DEBT OF THE BANK INCURRED BEFORE HIS OWNERSHIP OF THE STOCKGHINGHER V. BACHTELL'
Appellant, receiver of an insolvent bank, petitioned the
trial court for an order adjudging that the stockholders, including the appellees, should be required to pay to the receiver sums equal to the par value of the stock held, under
the "double liability" of stockholders in State banks. The
trial court passed a summary order to that effect, which
order the appellees petitioned to have rescinded. The petition for rescission specifically contested the liability of the
stockholders for such debts of the bank as were incurred at
times when the petitioners were not then stockholders. This
petition alleged "That the statutes of Maryland under and
by virtue of which said order of assessment was passed, impair the obligation of contracts, are discriminatory and deprive your petitioners of equal protection of the law, deprive your petitioners of property without due process of
law, and otherwise contravene the provisions of the Constitutions of Maryland and of the United States." The trial
court granted the petition for rescission of the summary
order and the receiver appealed. Held: Decree reversed
and cause remanded with costs to the appellant.
The ruling of the trial court limited the double liability
of stockholders at the time of receivership to debts of the
bank contracted during the period of such stock ownership.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals held them liable for all
debts of the bank regardless of when such debts were incurred.
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 (1819).
164 Md. 678, 182 Atl. 558 (1936). Appeal pending in the Supreme Court
of the United States, No. 298, October Term, 1936.

